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Successful financial outreach to the rural poor requires
institutional innovations that reduce the risks and
costs of lending small amounts of money.
For poor rural families in developing countries, access to credit and savings facil-ities such as banks has the potential to make the difference between grindingpoverty and an economically secure life. Well-managed savings facilities permit
households to build up funds for future investment or consumption. Credit enables
them to tap finances beyond their own resources and take advantage of profitable
investment opportunities. Farmers may invest in land or in new agricultural tech-
nology that will provide higher incomes, while rural households that do not own
land can establish or expand family enterprises. Credit and savings also serve as insur-
ance for the poor. In rural areas of developing countries, short-term loans or past
savings are often used to provide basic necessities when household incomes decline
temporarily—after a bad harvest or between agricultural seasons, for example.
But in most developing countries, rural financial services are sadly inadequate.
In countries as diverse as Ghana, Malawi, and Pakistan, access to credit and savings
facilities is severely limited for small farmers, tenants, and entrepreneurs, particu-
larly women. In many countries only about half of the loan applicants can borrow
an adequate amount at the going interest rate, either from formal institutions such
as banks and cooperatives or from the informal sector—friends, relatives, pawn-
brokers, and moneylenders. Those who want to borrow from the formal sector are
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usually deterred by the strict collateral requirements and high transaction costs fre-
quently involved in doing business with formal institutions, including time spent
in travel and doing paperwork. Many potential borrowers are in such need of credit
that they are willing to pay substantially higher interest rates in the informal
markets—sometimes as high as 80 percent per year. But the amount of credit avail-
able through informal markets is often constrained by bottlenecks in the local
supply of funds. Even households with annual incomes well above the poverty line
may experience difficulty in purchasing enough food during the preharvest season
when previous food stocks have been depleted.
The story on the savings side is similar. Costs involved in making small deposits
at faraway banks are high. Moreover, the transaction cost per dollar of deposit rises as
the size of the deposit becomes smaller, discouraging farmers and rural entrepreneurs
from making a series of tiny deposits, as they prefer to do. Many rural financial insti-
tutions choose not to accept deposits; others are legally forbidden to do so to protect
depositors from fraud and for other reasons. Because most credit and savings programs
still depend on the urban-based banking system for depositing their clients’ savings
and for channeling and disbursing loans, they usually are not able to reach out to loca-
tions far away from branches of state-owned or privately owned banks.
Traditional Institutions and the Rural Poor
As important as rural finances are, the task of providing credit and saving oppor-
tunities at a reasonable cost to those who have only meager assets has been neither
straightforward nor easy. Until the 1980s, in many developing countries, state-run
agricultural development banks—armed with subsidized funds and eloquent pro-
poor directives—took the lead in establishing formal credit markets in rural areas.
However, the shortcomings of the institutional principles they were based on—
collateralized lending, an organizational setup without any incentives to do busi-
ness with the poor, and pervasive political patronage—severely handicapped their
performance. Not only did they fail to serve the poor who could not pledge collat-
eral, but their inefficiency made them so dependent on state subsidies that they
became financially unsustainable. Since then, support for state-sponsored agri-
cultural banks has greatly declined, and the need for financial market reforms to
rectify distortions caused by past policies is almost universally acknowledged.
Now, the most basic roles of government—establishing macroeconomic sta-
bility, ensuring that financial markets are free to respond to economic incentives
while following sound banking practices, and maintaining and enforcing a legal
framework that ensures contract compliance—are beyond dispute. However, these
actions alone cannot trigger development of rural financial institutions that serve
the poor. This is because rural financial markets have inherent problems that make
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investments risky as well as costly, and formal financial institutions have been
unable to devise profitable savings and loan services for the rural poor. Information
about potential borrowers, especially in far-flung areas, is difficult to obtain, mak-
ing loan applications excessively costly to evaluate, especially when loans are small.
The poor also own few assets, making it infeasible for the financial institution to
secure its lending with collateral. As a result, private investors either shy away from
the financial sector or limit their services to financial institutions in the urban econ-
omy, where information on prospective borrowers is less costly to obtain. IFPRI
studies have found private commercial banks in most rural areas of developing coun-
tries conspicuous by their absence, except in a few high-potential, densely populated
areas. For example, in the rural areas of Cameroon and Pakistan, less than 10 per-
cent of loan transactions take place in the formal sector.
This is not to say that private-sector banks will not have a role in the rural finan-
cial sector in the future. Many countries such as Bangladesh, Madagascar, Malawi,
and Nepal initiated serious financial reforms only in the second half of the 1980s.
Therefore, it is too early to conclude that private banks, which are just now estab-
lishing themselves in urban areas, will not gradually expand their services to rural
areas as these become more developed and prosperous.
Currently, though, it is the lenders in informal markets that provide the bulk
of loans to the rural poor, according to IFPRI studies in Bangladesh, Egypt,
Madagascar, and Pakistan. In all these countries, informal lenders make loans with-
out collateral, using various techniques for screening applicants and enforcing repay-
ment. In Bangladesh, Cameroon, Madagascar, Nepal, and Pakistan, for example,
more than 90 percent of the loans are not secured by physical collateral. Households
or even small communities may enter into mutually beneficial risk-pooling schemes;
traders disburse credit to farmers in exchange for the right to market the growing
crop; shopkeepers increase sales by providing credit for food, farm inputs, and
household necessities; and large landholders secure access to labor in the peak sea-
son in return for earlier loan advances to laborers. In countries like Cameroon and
Egypt, informal credit and savings associations play an important role in the pro-
vision of financial services. In fact, the ingenuity of informal lenders and self-help
organizations in tailoring loan products to the requirements of their clients or
members makes them indispensable in both the urban and rural financial landscape
of developing countries.
But innovative and useful as the informal sector may be, it frequently runs up
against severe constraints. Informal credit markets, by their very nature, are seg-
mented. A “market” typically consists of a single village community. And informal
lenders seldom manage savings deposits. Hence, financial intermediation in the
sense of providing a common clearinghouse for borrowers and lenders does not take
place to the fullest extent possible. As a result, the supply of credit is limited, result-
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ing in either severe credit rationing or extremely high interest rates for some lenders.
It is not surprising, therefore, that in all studies conducted by IFPRI, informal sec-
tor transactions are generally small, short-term loans taken to finance the purchase
of urgently needed goods for household consumption—especially food—or, to a
lesser extent, inputs such as seeds and fertilizer. In Bangladesh, for example, the aver-
age size of a loan in the informal sector was about US$15 taken for about three
months. Invariably, when larger projects need to be financed, such as a new enter-
prise, an irrigation pump, or agricultural land, people turn to institutional lenders
in the formal sector. Also, especially in agricultural regions, risks arising out of
droughts or floods affect both informal lenders and borrowers simultaneously, so a
credit supply crunch is likely to take place just when the demand for credit peaks.
Formal institutions offer several advantages in this respect. Banks usually have
a network of branches across different regions of a country and are therefore in a bet-
ter position to diversify risks. And when banks are allowed to collect savings deposits,
they serve the needs of savers as well as borrowers. Formal institutions can also lever-
age funds in other financial markets such as the bond market. But, as already noted,
only a relatively few borrowers have access to formal financial institutions.
Overall, it is clear that the task of delivering financial services to the rural poor
cannot be left entirely to market forces.
The Promise of Innovative Institutions
Successful financial outreach to the rural poor requires institutional innovations that
reduce the risks and costs of lending small amounts of money. So far, most inno-
vations in microfinance have come from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
that do not have commercial profit as their principal objective. By taking fresh
approaches, these new microfinance institutions have penetrated rural financial
markets and serviced an underclass of borrowers in a way that was unimaginable
some 20 years ago. In 1988, IFPRI published one of the most detailed studies then
available of the innovations in group-based banking introduced by the Grameen
Bank of Bangladesh, which has provided credit to 2.1 million women in 36,000 vil-
lages. Since then, IFPRI has examined the experiences of other institutions, includ-
ing member-owned village banks in Madagascar; other large-scale, group-based
credit programs in Bangladesh and Malawi; and savings and credit cooperatives in
Cameroon. These innovative microfinance institutions have provided financial
services to the poor, increased their welfare, and often maintained impressive repay-
ment rates.
Far from being one-shot transfers, loans from such institutions have helped
poor families make permanent positive changes in the quality of their lives. In
Bangladesh, Madagascar, and Malawi, IFPRI studies show that over time poor
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households participating in innovative credit programs have increased their house-
hold income more than nonparticipants have. In Pakistan, access to credit was asso-
ciated with greater use of improved seed, fertilizer, and other inputs to enhance crop
yields. And in Malawi, profits from nonfarm businesses funded by the special credit
programs were reinvested in farms, through increased expenditures on improved
seed and fertilizer. By boosting farm production and overall household income, these
innovative institutions enabled poor households to acquire more and better food.
Of course, lack of capital is only one factor keeping poor rural households from
improving their welfare. In rural areas of developing countries, illiteracy is high, basic
social and market infrastructure is lacking, and many people are in poor health.
When seed or irrigation water for the farmer, market access for the rural producer,
or elementary bookkeeping skills for the would-be entrepreneur are absent, the
returns to financial services will be low or sometimes even wasted. It is not a co-
incidence, then, that in several countries the most successful NGO institutions have
operated in relatively well-endowed rural areas. In other cases, innovations have
offered financial services in combination with other complementary services. For
example, microfinance institutions such as the Bangladesh Rural Advancement
Committee (BRAC) and the Grameen Bank combine credit services with basic lit-
eracy programs, training in enterprise management, and education in health and
family planning. This bundling of services has, among other things, enabled these
institutions to successfully penetrate into high poverty areas and to achieve repay-
ment rates in excess of 95 percent.
Public Policy for the Future
It would be unwise to conclude that the new microfinance institutions such as the
Grameen Bank have found the right formula and all that is needed now is replica-
tion. One lesson is becoming increasingly clear: there is no single blueprint for suc-
cess. Recent experience has shown that programs must be designed to harness a
community’s particular strengths—based, for example, on local resources, historical
and cultural experiences, ethnicity, and occupational patterns—in order to reduce
costs of screening participants, monitoring financial activity, and enforcing contrac-
tual obligations. The group-based system has worked well in Bangladesh, whereas sev-
eral programs in Indonesia successfully use local agents to assess borrowers’
creditworthiness. Institutional design varies even for similar target groups within the
same country. In Bangladesh, for example, the Association for Social Advancement
and BRAC give loans to clients themselves, while Rangpur-Dinajpur Rural Services
forms and trains groups, which then obtain agricultural loans from banks.
Designing, experimenting with, and building financial institutions for the
poor require economic resources and adequate consideration of longer-term social
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returns. By itself, the market has not been able to stimulate much institutional in-
novation. In the last two decades, NGOs have taken the lead partly because the
subsidies they receive from donors and government organizations make it feasible
for them to invest in innovations. Just as public policy should play a role in pro-
moting technological innovations that generate social benefits, it should also help
promote institutional innovations that assist the disadvantaged or address intrinsic
market failures. As policymakers seek to make rational policy choices, they must
weigh the social costs of designing and building financial institutions for the poor
against their social benefits. Well-directed support, including initial subsidies, to
promising microfinance institutions is likely to have payoffs in both equity (services
to the poor) and long-term efficiency (reduced cost of services). This is a point of
view that those who argue for a complete removal of subsidies should not ignore.
Of course, some experiments in institutional innovations will succeed, while
others will fail. Public policy will need to support and evaluate this experimenta-
tion process and nurture those designs or institutions that hold promise of future
success. Governments, donors, practitioners, and research institutions must work
together closely to pinpoint the costs, benefits, and future potential of emerging
financial institutions.
In the long run, the payoff to public investment in institutional innovations
will lie in the transformation of now nascent microfinance institutions into full-
fledged, financial intermediaries that offer savings and credit services to small-
holders, tenant farmers, and rural entrepreneurs, thus alleviating poverty. Evidence
of this transformation is already emerging in countries such as Bangladesh,
Indonesia, and Thailand. The payoff will also come from the development of viable
lending methodologies that private commercial banks can readily adopt to profitably
provide savings and loan services to the poor. This is already happening in some parts
of the world: in urban Latin America, for example, private commercial banks have
started to adopt group-based lending methods developed and tested by nonprofit
organizations that initially depended on public support. With the right combina-
tion of public policy, private initiative, and objective research, public investments
in financial institutions designed to serve the poor in other rural areas of Africa, Asia,
and Latin America will bear fruit as well.
